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Domestic Relations-APPONTMENT OF COUNSEL FOR THE ABUSED
CHILD-STATUTORY SCHEMES AND THE NEW YORK APPROACH
NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY SE=cr COMMITTEE ON
CHILD ABUSE, REPORT (1972)
Five years have elapsed since the landmark decision of In re Gault.1
The widespread impact of Gault and its progeny2 on the American
juvenile justice system continues to subject the legal framework sur-
rounding children to reexamination and change.8 The juvenile court4
system has not fully responded to the demands thrust upon it; as the
Supreme Court recently recognized, it continues to fall short of pre-
vious expectations.5
Present juvenile law reform has been directed almost exclusively
at delinquency in an attempt to secure constitutional rights necessary to
promote "fundamental fairness" in delinquency proceedings.6 Conse-
1 387 US. 1 (1967). The Supreme Court in Gault secured the right to counsel as a
constitutional safeguard in delinquency proceedings against a juvenile defendant. The case
involved a 15-year-old boy who was charged with making offensive telephone calls. The
Court held:
We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency which may result in com-
mitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the child
and his parents must be notified of the child's right to be represented by counsel
retained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be ap-
pointed to represent the child.
Id. at 41. The Court also held that due process required that an accused juvenile be
given adequate written notice of the charges against him (id. at 33-34), and that he be
advised of his right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him (id. at 56-57).
The privilege against self-incrimination was also assured. Id. at 55-57.
2 In DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28 (1969), the Supreme Court refused to pass on
the issue of whether a jury trial was required in delinquency cases. This question was
recently answered in the negative. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). The
Court has held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required in these proceedings.
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966);
Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
3 This point was made clear in the prefatory note to the Uniform Juvenile Court Act.
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAwS, HANDBOOK or THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE 246
(1968). The Uniform Juvenile Court Act is also contained in this volume. Id. at 248-89.
4 In this Note, the terms "juvenile court" and "family court" will be used inter-
changeably. In New York, juveniles are subject to the jurisdiction of the New York
Family Court. N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 115(a)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
5 "The juvenile concept held high promise. We are reluctant to say that, despite dis-
appointments of grave dimensions, it still does not hold promise." McKeiver v. Pennsyl-
vania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971).
6 See N.Y. STATE ASSEMBLY SELEcT COMM€/. ON CHID ABusE, R PORT 147 (1972) [here-
inafter dted as CHILD ABuSE REPORT]. See also Comment, Dependent-Neglect Proceedings:
A Case for Procedural Due Process, 9 DuQuESNE L. REv. 651, 651-52 (1971).
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quently, other aspects of children's law have been neglected. This is not
a necessary result, however. Courts dealing with children are empow-
ered to consider much more than the problem of delinquency. All
aspects of a child's welfare are within their jurisdiction.7 One important
area in which the juvenile courts of each state are given authority to
act is in instances of child abuse.8 In many states, acts of child abuse have
been made the subject of criminal sanctions.9
7 Juvenile courts are usually afforded jurisdiction in the following areas: abuse, delin-
quency, neglect, abandoned children, dependent children, unruly children, child custody,
termination of the parent-child relationship, adoption, judicial consent to the marriage
of a minor, commitment of a mentally ill minor, and proceedings under the Interstate
Compact on Juveniles. See, e.g., UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT AcT § 3; Standard Juvenile
Court Act § 8, in 5 NAT'L PROBATION & PAROLE Ass'N J. 344 (1959).
8 Child abuse has been defined as the "intentional, nonaccidental use of physical
force, or intentional, nonaccidental acts of omission, on the part of a parent or other care-
taker interacting with a child in his care, aimed at hurting, injuring, or destroying that
child." D. GIL, VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN 6 (1970). One statutory definition of abuse is
as follows: "'Abused' means the infliction of physical injury upon a child by his parents
or others legally responsible for him and shall include exploiting or overworking a child
to such an extent that his health, morals, or well-being are endangered." IDAHO CODE § 16-
1625(m) (Supp. 1971). See also N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr. § 1012(e) (McKinney Supp. 1972),
discussed in Note, An Appraisal of New York's Statutory Response to the Problem of
Child Abuse, 7 COLum. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 51, 64-65 (1971).
The statutory scheme may vary from state to state. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 16-1626
(Supp. 1971) (abuse as separate aspect of court's jurisdiction); N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT art. 10
(McKinney Supp. 1972) (same); CAL. WELF. & INsT'NS CODE § 600 (West 1972) (incorporat-
ing abuse within court's neglect or dependency powers); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 260.111(1),
.015(10) (1971 & Supp. 1972) (same). See generally Paulsen, A Summary of Child Abuse
Legislation, in THE BATrERED CHILD 237-61 (R. Helfer & C. Kempe eds. 1968) [hereinafter
cited as THE BATrER CILD].
In every state, juvenile courts have jurisdiction over "neglected children." Al-
though the statutory provisions are of great variety and may not in terms ex-
plicitly refer to the problem of child abuse, it is submitted that in all states the
"battered child" falls within the category of "neglected children" as defined by
the relevant juvenile court act.
Paulsen, The Legal Framework for Child Protection, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 679, 693 (1966).
Child abuse is not a new phenomenon. "The neglect and abuse of children has been
evidenced since the beginning of time. The natural animalistic instincts of the human
race have not changed with the passing of the centuries .... This wastage of children's
lives continues and appears to be increasing even in this enlightened modern day." V.
FONTANA, THE MALTREATED CHILD 3 (2d ed. 1971). See also Radbill, A History of Child
Abuse and Infanticide, in THE BATrERED CHILD 3. The magnitude of the abuse problem
from both legal and social standpoints has been recognized only recently. See, e.g., D. GIL,
supra at 92-132; THE BATrERED CHILD App. A; Note, supra at 58.
The New York child abuse reporting law became effective in 1964. See N.Y. Soc. SERV.
LAW § 383-a (McKinney Supp. 1972). From August 1, 1964, to January 31, 1965, 211 reports
of abuse were made; 416 cases of abuse were reported in calendar year 1966, while 3,224
were reported for calendar year 1971. CHILD ABUSE REPORT 22. In 1968 there were 36 fatali-
ties attributed to abuse, and in 1970 there were 93. Id. at 23. The Select Committee on Child
Abuse concluded, however, that "[c]hild abuse is much more prevalent than is revealed
by current statistics." Id. at 22.
9 See, eg., CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a (West 1970); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 260.10(1), (2)
(McKinney Supp. 1972).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Courts have acted and apparently continue to act in abuse cases
from the ancient and now criticized concept of parens patriae,O con-
ducting their proceedings in an informal atmosphere ostensibly de-
signed to protect the child's interests.:" This policy has served to deny
abused children most constitutional safeguards-most significantly, the
right to counsel.' New York, a leader in the field of juvenile law re-
form, has recently readdressed itself to this problem, considering both
the need for counsel and the problems connected with fulfilling that
need. 3
I
PRESENT STATUTORY APPROACHES
Because courts have ignored the abused child's right to appointed
counsel as a constitutional guarantee, 4 the legislatures of many states
10 See In re Gault, 887 U.S. 1, 14-25 (1967); see H.H. Lou, JUVENILE CouRTs IN THE
UNrrED STATES 135 (1927); W. SHERMAN, STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FmmILY CouRTs 55-57,
112-14 (1966); U.S. Children's Bureau, Juvenile Court Standards, reprinted in H.H. Lou,
supra at 221-81.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that blind adherence to the doctrine of parens
patriae can no longer be substituted for reason or used as a justification for conduct which
results in the deprivation of constitutional rights. In re Gault, 887 US. 1, 16-17 (1967);
cj. Coffee, Privacy Versus Parens Patriae: The Role of Police Records in the Sentencing
and Surveillance of Juveniles, 57 CoRNELL L. REV. 571, 574-75 (1972).
11 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1967).
12 Given the complexity of modem courtroom procedure, it is dear that the presence
of an attorney is the only means of assuring adequate representation of individual interests
in the courtroom. See generally Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Without counsel
the abused child is in no position to demonstrate to the court how his best interests may
be served. Although he is the object of the controversy, he is without means to present
the views and facts most significant to him. It has been said that he stands in a position
no better than that of a chattel. See Grumet, The Plaintive Plaintiffs: Victims of the Bat-
tered Child Syndrome, 4 FAmmy L.Q. 296, 314-15 (1970). See also Inker & Perretta, A
Child's Right to Counsel in Custody Cases, 5 FAMIy L.Q. 108, 117 (1971). Counsel for the
child could serve his client's interests by transforming the child from the passive object
of the controversy into an active, interested participant in the adjudicative process. For
example, the child's lawyer could cross-examine witnesses presented by the other parties
and ask questions which would otherwise go unanswered. See Grumet, supra at 314. He
could make an independent investigation of the facts and allegations and apprise the
court of his findings. See notes 22-23 and accompanying text infra (Kansas statutory
scheme). And he could bring to light, by means of primary evidence, factors which would
have been otherwise obtained by secondary evidence and inference. Inker & Perretta, supra
at 115.
13 See notes 35-66 and accompanying text infra.
14 Only one federal appellate court prior to Gault (and none since that decision) has
directly considered the issue of counsel in abuse cases. See In re Custody of a Minor, 250
F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1957). In that case the court considered an appeal from the denial of
a habeas corpus petition on the issue of whether a minor had the right to separate counsel
in a proceeding in which his parents were charged with inadequate care and which could
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have filled this gap by statute.15 Jurisdictions can presently be class-
ified, with some overlap, as following one of three approaches: (1) an
absolute right to counsel for the abused child, (2) a non-absolute or
discretionary right to appointed counsel, and (3) no right to counsel.16
A. An Absolute Right to Counsel
An absolute right to counsel for the abused child is created by
statutes which guarantee representation for the child in all abuse pro-
ceedings. Appointment of an attorney by the court is the standard prac-
lead to the child's removal from his home. The court stated that it did not have to decide
this issue affirmatively because the Director of Social Work had afforded the child with
adequate legal representation. Circuit Judge, now Chief Justice, Burger speaking for the
court went on to state:
Conceivably a case could arise where conflict between the public welfare author-
ity and the parents might lead the Juvenile Court to appoint separate counsel
for the child but it is sufficient simply to acknowledge that possibility and leave
treatment of that problem to the sound discretion of the Juvenile Court ....
Id. at 421 (dictum). See also Heyford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968). Even under
a restrictive reading of the Gault decision, however, one finds that case applicable to cer-
tain instances of child abuse. Gault held that counsel must be afforded as a constitutional
right whenever a delinquency proceeding could result in a child's incarceration. 387 U.S. at
41. Many states empower their juvenile courts to commit an abused child to a state insti-
tution or training school See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INsr'Ns CODE § 727 (West 1972); Mo. Rxv.
STAT. §§ 211.031, 211.181 (1969); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.34, 2151.353 (Supp. 1971).
See also Campbell, The Neglected Child: His and His Family's Treatment Under Massa-
chusetts Law and Practice and Their Rights Under the Due Process Clause, 4 SUroLK
U.L. Rlv. 631, 674-77 (1970). Although the intent is protective rather than corrective, the
result is the same. "Depriving a child of his liberty, regardless of the reason, is inherently
punitive from the child's point of view." Wizner, The Defense Counsel: "Neither Father,
Judge, Probation Officer or Social Worker," 7 TRIAL, Sept.-Oct., 1971, at 30, 31.
The comment to Rule 39 of the Model Rules for Juvenile Courts also lends support
for the provision of counsel for the abused child in this situation. "The child has a right
to representation because his liberty or freedom of action is at stake." CouNciL OF JuDGEs
oF TE NAT COUNCIL ON CRanM AND DELINQUENCY, MODEL R.ULrS FOp JUVENILE Couxrs
P. 39, Comment at 83 (1969). When the prospect of institutionalization looms for an
abused child, due process and equal protection should permit no distinction.
15 See notes 17-35 and accompanying text infra.
Perhaps the most significant evidence [of changing attitudes toward legal represen.
tation of juveniles] is the legislation which has been passed within the last decade.
... In at least one-third of the States the statutes now have provisions relating
to the right to representation, notice of right to counsel, or the assignment of
counsel or both. In still other States similar provisions have been established by
rule of court.
W. SH EnmAN, supra note 10, at 56. This was written in 1966, one year prior to Gault.
10 The term counsel, when used in the abuse context, must mean appointed counsel
or a right thereto. No state prohibits outright the appearance of private counsel in a
child's behalf. See Campbell, supra note 14, at 670. The absence of such an impediment
still falls far short of desirable goals. What is needed is a positive requirement that every
abused child have an absolute right to court-appointed counsel in every proceeding in
which private counsel has not been retained.
[Vol. 58:177
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tice in "absolute counsel" jurisdictions; only in rare instances will
private counsel be retained.
Seventeen states presently afford such representation by statute or
rule of court.17 The Uniform Juvenile Court Act also contains an ab-
solute counsel provision: "Counsel must be provided for a child not
represented by his parent, guardian or custodian. If the interests of
2 or more parties conflict separate counsel shall be provided for each
of them."' 8 Georgia'9 and North Dakota2 ° have adopted this provision.
The Model Rules for Juvenile Courts provides for mandatory appoint-
ment of counsel whenever parent-child conflict is present, as in abuse
proceedings.21
The statutory scheme in certain states extends beyond mere ap-
pointment of counsel in all abuse cases and presents a more compre-
hensive approach. The Kansas juvenile act, for example, provides for
the appointment of both counsel and a guardian ad litem in all abuse
cases. 22 This guardian is required independently to investigate the facts
and allegations of the petition and report his findings to the court. He
17 Alaska (ALAsKA P. Juv. PROC. 14 & 15; cf. ALAsKA STAT. § 47.10.050 (1962)); Califor-
nia (CAL. WELv. & INsr'Ns CODE §§ 600(d), 634.5, 681 (West 1972)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN.
§ 24A-2001 (Supp. 1971)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 16-1631 (Supp. 1971)); Illinois (ImL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 37, § 701-20 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972)); Iowa (IowA CODE ANN. § 232.28 (1969);
see Orcutt v. State, 173 N.W.2d 66 (Iowa 1969)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-817, 821
(Supp. 1971)); Kentucky (ch. 825, § 1, [1972] Ky. Acts 1500, amending Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 208.060 (1969)); Maryland (MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-18(d) (Supp. 1971). Prior to the
enactment of this provision, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that in abuse cases the
child was entitled to representation by a guardian ad litem. In re Cager, 251 Md. 473, 248
A.2d 384 (1968).); Minnesota (MnN. STAT. ANN. § 260.155(2) (1971)); MxNN. R.P., Juv. Or. P.
2-1(3)(b), 2-1(5)); Nebraska (NEB. REv. SrAT. § 43-205.06 (Supp. 1971)); New York (N.Y.
FAMmIY Or. Acr §§ 241-49 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1972)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT.
CODE § 27-20-26 (Supp. 1971)); Ohio (Osno REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.281, .351, .352 (Supp.
1971); see State v. Hershberger, 150 N.E.2d 671 (Ohio Juv. Ct. 1958)); Oregon (ORE. Rv.
STAT. § 419.498(2) (1972); see State v. Jamison, 251 Ore. 114, 444 P-9d 15 (1968)); Vermont
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 653(a) (Supp. 1972)); and Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-173
(Supp. 1972)).
As indicated, the judiciaries of Alaska and Minnesota have promulgated rules of court
which afford an absolute right to counsel, reflecting a favorable judicial attitude in these
states.
18 UNIFoRm Ju vEMILE COuRT AC § 26.
19 GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2001 (Supp. 1971).
20 N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-6 (Supp. 1971).
21 MODEL RuLEs FOR JUVENLE Cotmrs, supra note 14, R. 39.
22 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 88-821 (Supp. 1971) provides in part:
In all hearings the judge of the juvenile court shall appoint a guardian ad litem
who shall be an attorney at law to appear for, represent, and defend:
(a) A child who is the subject of proceedings under this act ....
(b) ... The guardian ad litem shall make an independent investigation of
the facts and representations made in the petition.
For a decision under prior Kansas law, see In re McCoy, 184 Kan. 1, 334 P.2d 820 (1959).
1972]
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must also be present at every hearing.23 A similar but less detailed ap-
proach is employed in Ohio.24
B. The Discretionary or Non-Absolute Right to Appointed Counsel
A number of jurisdictions leave the appointment of counsel for
abused children to the discretion of the court; some restrict its appli-
cation to specific circumstances. Discretionary statutes empower the
court to appoint counsel when it believes that taking this action would
be in the child's interest or when otherwise needed to promote fairness
and justice. Non-absolute statutory schemes provide for mandatory
appointment of counsel in abuse proceedings of a specified nature, such
as cases in which "termination of parental rights is a possible remedy."25
These statutes leave the appointment of counsel in other cases to the
discretion of the court.
Seventeen jurisdictions follow either the discretionary2 6 or the non-
absolute2 approach. The Standard Juvenile Court Act 28 and the Stan-
dard Family Court Act29 also include the discretionary formulation. In
cases in which parental rights may be terminated, two states make the
appointment of counsel mandatory upon the request of a party without
23 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-821 (Supp. 1971).
24 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.281, .351, .352 (Supp. 1971).
25 OuLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1109(b) (Supp. 1972).
26 Alabama (ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 359 (1958)); Arizona (ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-225(A)
(Supp. 1972) (upon finding of conflict of interest between parent and child)); Connecticut
(CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-66b, -66c (Supp. 1972)); District of Columbia (D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-2404(b) (Supp. IV 1971)); Hawaii (HAwAi REv. STAT. § 57-41 (1968)); Michigan
(MIci. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(598.17) (1962); MicH. Juv. Or. R. 6.3(A)(2)(a)); Montana (MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. §§ 10-504, -508 (1968)); Nevada (NEv. Rxv. STAT. § 62.085(1) (1971)); Rhode
Island (R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 14-1-31 (1970); see In re Palmer, 100 R.I 170, 212 A.2d 61
(1965)); South Dakota (S.D. ComaiLm LAws ANN. §§ 26-8-22.1, .2 (Supp. 1972) (when
parental rights may be terminated)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-96 (Supp. 1971));
Washington (WASH. Juv. Cr. R. 7.2(c); see In re Dunagan, 74 Wash. 2d 807, 447 P.2d 87
(1968)); Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.25(5), (6) (1957)).
27 Colorado (COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-6 (Supp. 1967) (mandatory upon request
of any party without financial means when parental rights may be terminated; discretion-
ary when court determines interests of child need further protection)); Missouri (Mo. Ray.
STAT. §§ 211.211, .471(2) (1969) (mandatory for child when child may be committed to state
training school; discretionary when parental rights may be terminated); Oklahoma (OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1109(b) (Supp. 1972) (mandatory upon request of any party without
financial means if parental rights may be terminated; discretionary in all other cases));
Wyoming (Wro. STAT. ANN. § 14-115.23 (Supp. 1971) (mandatory. for child upon request
if child and parents or guardian are without financial means; discretionary in all other
cases)).
28 Standard Juvenile Court Act § 19, in 5 NAT'L PROBATION & PAROLE Ass'N J. 367
(1959).
29 Standard Family Court Act § 19, in id. at 137.
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financial means;30 two others leave appointment to the discretion of
the court.3 1 In several other special situations, with limited applicabil-
ity to child abuse, some statutes provide for mandatory appointment
of counsel.3 2
C. No Statutory Right to Counsel
A great number of states afford no statutory right to counsel. These
"no counsel" jurisdictions can be divided into two distinct groups. One
group makes provision for a right to counsel in juvenile court proceed-
ings such as delinquency, but implicitly denies this representation to
an abused child.33 The other group makes no statutory mention of a
right to counsel in any juvenile court action.34 Within this second clas-
30 Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-6 (Supp. 1967)) and Oklahoma (OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1109(b) (Supp. 1972)).
31 Missouri (Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.471(2) (1969)) and South Dakota (S.D. CoMPLE)
LAws ANN. § 26-8-22.1 (Supp. 1972)).
82 In Missouri, for example, counsel must be afforded before a child can be com-
mitted to a state training school. Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.211 (1969).
33 Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-217, -227 (1964)); Maine (ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 3791-800 (1964) (abused children generally; no right to counsel afforded)); Massachu-
setts (MAss. Disr. Cr. R. 85 (counsel mandated only in delinquency cases)); Mississippi
(Miss. CODE ANN. § 7187-08 (Supp. 1971) (informal proceedings)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 9:6-1 to -12 (1960 & Supp. 1972) (abused children generally; no right to counsel
afforded); NJ. CT. R. 5:3-3(a), 5:9-1(d) (indigent party entitled to counsel in delinquency
cases)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-285, -286 (1969 & Supp. 1971) (counsel guar-
anteed only when child may be committed to state institution pursuant to delinquency
proceedings)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-1095.14, .19 (Supp. 1971) (same));
Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-226 (Supp. 1971) (indigent party entitled to counsel at
delinquency hearings); see Undervood v. Adamson, - Tenn. App. - , 463 S.W.2d 952
(1970) (neglected child not constitutionally entitled to an attorney)); Texas (TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. art. 2332 (1969) (court will appoint "some suitable person" to represent child in
dependency and neglect proceedings if neither parents nor guardian can be found); see
Grider v. Noonan, 438 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (failure to appoint suitable person
to represent child does not render dependency order fatally defective)); West Virginia
(W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-13 (Supp. 1972) (counsel provided in criminal actions before
juvenile court); cf. id. §§ 49-6-1 to 49-6-5 (1966 & Supp. 1972) (no correlative right under
"procedure in neglect cases')).
84 Delaware (cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 983, 1177 (1953)); Florida (Cf. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 39.09(1) (1961); Steinhauer v. State, 206 So. 2d 25 (Fla. App. 1967) (right to counsel
mandated for children to extent specified in Gault)); Indiana (Cf. IND. CODE § 31-5-7-15
(1971)); Louisiana (cf. A. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:1579 (1968)); In re State ex rel. Longworth,
233 So. 2d 699 (La. App. 1970) (right to counsel mandated for children to extent specified in
Gault)); New Hampshire (see In re Poulin, 100 N.H. 458, 129 A.2d 672 (1957) (construing
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169.9 (1964) to allow counsel to attend juvenile proceedings, but
recognizing no right to counsel)); New Mexico (cf. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-4 (1968)); Penn-
sylvania (cf. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 250 (1965). But see Pa. S. Bill No. 439 (1971), a pro-
posed new juvenile act, based on the Uniform Act and affording an absolute right to coun-
sel, pending in the state legislature; id. § 20 deals with the right to have counsel appointed.
See also Comment, Proposed Pennsylvania Juvenile Act, 75 Dic L. Rv. 235 (1971))
19721
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sification, a child's right to counsel exists only as far as the holding
of Gault is interpreted to mandate.
II
THE RECENT NEw You APPROACH
The apathetic attitude regarding the plight of abused children
which pervades most state statutory schemes has not gained a foothold
in New York. New York's legislators, actively seeking solutions to the
abuse problem, have enacted a comprehensive statutory framework
affording many rights to the child, including the right to counsel.8 5
These efforts, which commenced with the adoption of a uniform, state-
wide Family Court Act in 1962,36 have recently been enhanced by a
major legislative study3
Antedating Gault by several years, the Family Court Act estab-
lished a system of "Law Guardians," who must be attorneys, to represent
all children not represented by private counsel. 8 The Act premises this
guarantee upon a "finding that counsel is often indispensable to a prac-
tical realization of due process of law and may be helpful in making
reasoned determinations of fact and proper orders of disposition."89
In 1969, after the tragic death of a victim of child abuse,40 the
85 The New York Assembly Select Committee on Child Abuse expresses this view:
"Although this newly established expansion of due process procedures has been primarily
directed toward delinquency proceedings, its side effects, at least in the State's more urban
counties, have substantially altered the character of neglect and abuse proceedings as
well." CHIL ABusE REPORT 147.
36 N.Y. FA mY Cr. Acr. (McKinney 1962), originally enacted as ch. 686, [1962] N.Y.
Laws 3043.
37 This is the study made by the New York State Assembly Select Committee on Child
Abuse. See generally CifL ABusE REPORT; notes 48-59 and accompanying text infra.
38 N.Y. F Asn~y Cr. Acr. §§ 241-49 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1972). Id. § 241 (McKinney
Supp. 1972) presently provides as follows:
This act declares that minors who are the subject of family court proceedings
should be represented by counsel of their own choosing or by law guardians.
This declaration is based on a finding that counsel is often indispensible to a
practical realization of due process of law and may be helpful in making reasoned
determinations of fact and proper orders of disposition. This part establishes
a system of law guardians for minors who often require the assistance of counsel
to help protect their interests and to help them express their wishes to the court.
Nothing in this act is intended to preclude any other interested person from
appearing by counsel.
Id. § 242 provides that Law Guardians must be attorneys. d. § 249 requires the appoint-
ment of a Law Guardian for any minor who is the subject of an abuse proceeding and
who does not have independent legal representation.
39 Id. § 241 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
40 The body-of 3-year-old Roxanne Felumero was found in the East River on March
[Vol. 58:177
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Speaker of the New York State Assembly appointed a select committee
to study the laws governing the investigation and adjudication of abuse
cases and to recommend changes in those laws.41 The initial work of this
committee culminated in the unanimous adoption by the legislature of
article 10 of the Family Court Act, concerning the law and procedure
to be followed in child abuse (protective) proceedings. 42
At the recommendation of the Child Abuse Committee, article 10
was amended in 1970 to require notice of the right to counsel, retained
or appointed, to all children involved in abuse proceedings.43 The law
was also amended to direct the corporation counsel of the City of
New York and the district attorney of each county to become a "neces-
sary party" in these cases to aid in the presentation of petitions and to
fulfill an investigatory and fact gathering role.44
25, 1969. The child's stepfather was subsequently indicted for murder. A barrage of news-
paper publicity followed the discovery that a neglect petition, charging the child's mother
with assault, had been filed in the Family Court several weeks prior to the child's death.
The case of Roxanne Felumero led to a tremendous public outcry against the problem of
child abuse and the existing abuse laws. It resulted in a judicial investigation as well as
the legislative actions taken. See JuDiCIARY RELATIONS CoM m. OF THE APPELLATE
DivisioN, FnRsT DEP r, REPORT ON THE ROXANNE FELumERo CASE (1969), reprinted in 161
N.Y.LJ. 1 (June 30, 1969), 162 id. 1 (July 1, 1969), id. 1 (July 2, 1969), and id. 1 (July 3,
1969)).
41 See CHim AnusE REPORT ii.
42 N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT. art. 10 (McKinney Supp. 1972), originally enacted as ch. 264,
[196 9] N.Y. Laws 1011. The press called this the "Children's Bill of Rights." See
Cm- ABUSE REPoR ii-iii.
43 N.Y. FAMILY CT. Aar. § 1043 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
44 Id. § 254(b). The Committee summarized the changes effected in the counsel pro-
visions of the law by the 1969 and 1970 amendments in the following terms:
This Committee was cognizant of these problems when it redrafted Article 10 in
1970. Section 1016 of the 1969 law provided that "in the City of New York an
abused child ... be represented by a police attorney" or outside the City, by the
appropriate District Attorney. This was an attempt on the Committee's part to
insure the presence in Court of someone obliged and capable of protecting an
allegedly abused child by forcefully collecting and presenting evidence to the
Family Court. The dual roles of prosecuting the parent and representing the
child were hence assigned to the Police Attorneys and District Attorneys. Although
the prosecutorial emphasis improved the discovery and presentation of informa-
tion to the court, the dual role presented professional problems for the attorneys
involved. For example, the Police Attorney might obtain information from the
child in an Article 10 proceeding which he might want to use to prosecute the
child in a delinquency proceeding. In addition, there is obvious ambiguity in
prosecuting the parent and representing the child whose desire, rightly or
wrongly, is to remain with his parents.
For these and other reasons, the Committee concluded that it was inappropri-
ate to continue the dual role of these public prosecutors and so reintroduced
the Law Guardians as representatives of the child. In accomplishing the latter,
certain changes were made in the operative Family Court Act sections to clarify
past ambiguities. Previously, section 241 provided that children had "a right to
the assistance of counsel." The words "shall be represented by counsel" were
substituted to make it clear that the Law Guardian had the child as his client.
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The Committee continued its work beyond the achievement of
these immediate goals. It held hearings throughout the state and re-
evaluated the effectiveness of the law in operation.4 5 This three-year
investigation culminated in the comprehensive Child Abuse Report
published in April 1972, directing attention to the role of counsel in
abuse cases and representing a major thrust toward better representa-
tion. The Committee's primary conclusion concerning counsel for the
child was that in many political subdivisions of the state, the Law
Guardians had failed to protect and represent the interests of the child
adequately.46 Its major recommendation was that a position known as
the "Children's Attorney" should be created to conduct effective inves-
tigations and to present abuse petitions on behalf of the child.47
The Report strongly criticized the role that the Law Guardians
had played. The Committee found them ineffective, in most instances,
in the investigation and presentation of abuse cases, and generally fall-
ing far short of the contributions expected of them. 48 The assemblymen
To buttress this change, section 241 was further amended to state that the purpose
of counsel for the child is "to help protect their interests and to help them express
their wishes to the court."
CHuLn AnusE REPORT 151-52. The Committee continued:
This Committee's findings concerning Law Guardians, led it, in 1970, to provide
Corporation Counsels and District Attorneys as "necessary parties" in child
abuse proceedings. Their role is to aid in the "presentation" of petitions, which
includes investigations and fact-gathering. . . . The presence of an effective
advocate, someone to gather, marshal and present evidence is crucial to the ad-
judication of child protective cases.
Id. 154 (citation omitted).
45 Public hearings were held in Albany, Syracuse, Rochester, Mineola, and New York
City. Inspections were made of child care facilities and courts. Discussions were held with
many "Family Court judges, attorneys, child welfare professionals, and families in trouble,
the 'consumers' of child welfare services." Id. vii.
46 See id. at 147-58.
47 See id. at 154-56.
[T]o ensure that the Children's Attorney is independent of any local agency, he
should be appointed by the county executive or legislature with the proviso that,
although he may be the local legal official, he may not be an employee or official
of any other county agency or department.
Id. at 155.
48 The Report discusses how the Law Guardian had been expected to serve both as
attorney and as guardian ad litem. The Committee cited Isaacs, The Role of the Lawyer
in Representing Minors in the New Family Court, 12 BuFrMAO L. REV. 501, 519 (1968) to
support their position:
The role of the lawyer representing a child in a neglect proceeding may differ
substantially from that which he performs in delinquency or person in need of
supervision proceedings. It is in the neglect proceeding that his role as a guardian
rather than as an advocate becomes predominant. He is not called upon to defend
but rather to ascertain, where the best interests of his ward lie and to exert his
efforts to secure the disposition which in his view would best serve those interests.
The ultimate decisions he will be called upon to make will be basically non-legal
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also discovered a significant difference in the quality of performance
of these lawyers in urban and non-urban areas of the state.49 The ef-
fectiveness of the urban Law Guardians, who are generally attorneys
of the Legal Aid Society, 0 was found to be undermined by two fac-
tors: heavy caseloads51 and the lawyers' "institutional bent."52 Empha-
sis was placed on the fact that these Law Guardians also represented
children in delinquency actions, which created a bias on their part
toward trying to prevent removal of the child from his home-a bias
that had been wrongly carried over into abuse proceedings.5 8
The Committee's response to the operation of the Law Guardian
system in the non-urban subdivisions of the state was more favorable.
They observed that in a number of these areas, attorneys fulfilling this
role conducted active pre-trial investigations and played a forceful part
in proceedings."4 The Report noted, however, that these "effective"
attorneys represented only a minority of all Law Guardians55 and that
the Law Guardians as a group had failed to assume a role of active rep-
resentation. 6
Viewing the Law Guardians as ineffective, the Committee pro-
posed that a full time "Children's Attorney" be appointed in each
county.57 A bill to effectuate this proposal was introduced in the legis-
lature by the Committee and the Speaker of the Assembly.58 The pro-
in character and will impose upon him an awesome responsibility since the dis-
position made may effect the entire future life of his client for good or ill.
Quoted in CuiLD ABusE REPORT 148.
49 "The nature of the role of Law Guardian seems to vary from attorney to attorney,
but most distinctly from urban to rural or suburban areas." CsrLD ABusE REPORT 148.
50 See id. at 148-49.
51 See id. at 149. The Committee found that "many Law Guardians perform no pre-
trial investigations, collect little evidence and play a passive, watching role during the Court
proceedings-save to make occasional recommendations to the judge." Id. It also pointed
out that "the publicly funded Legal Aid Law Guardian has a caseload of such size that
he cannot adequately prepare any of his cases." Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 149-50.
54 Id. at 148. "When they are convinced that a child is abused or neglected, these
attorneys take on a prosecutor-like role as they press for a Court adjudication and appro-
priate disposition." Id.
55 Id.
56 "This Committee had hoped that the combination of these changes [the 1969 and
1970 amendments] and the history of the Felumero case would cause the Law Guardian
to assume a more active role in child protection proceedings. This has not happened."
Id. at 152-53.
57 Id. at 154-56. "[G]iven the continuing failure of the majority of Law Guardians to
fulfill the role envisioned for them, the Committee now concludes that there must be a
legal office established in each county with responsibility for the effective investigation and,
presentation of all child protective cases." Id. at 155 (emphasis in original).
58 (1972) Assy. Int. No. 12284 (Committee on Rules) (introduced April 21, 1972). This
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posed Children's Attorney would assume the role presently given to
the corporation counsel of the City of New York and the district at-
torney of other counties. 59 He would be a specialized public prosecutor
and a "necessary party" to all abuse proceedings, being charged with
the duty to investigate and present the petition in abuse proceedings. 0
The Children's Attorney would represent the petitioner, the state, and
its subdivisions-not children themselves,61 although his purpose would
be "the protection of children and the community through justice and
due process."' 2 The Law Guardian would remain the child's attorney,
despite the Committee's prior findings.63
measure would repeal N.Y. FAMILY Or. Acr. § 254 (McKinney Supp. 1972) and replace
it as follows:
§ 254. Presentation by children's attorney.
(a) In order to preserve and protect the rights and safety of a child, it is
deemed essential that there be a public official solely responsible for the effective
investigation, preparation and presentation of cases in the family court. This
declaration is based upon a finding that counsel in support of the petition is
essential to obtain the full disclosure and presentation of evidence to the court,
and is indispensable for accurate determinations of law and findings of fact and
for proper orders of disposition.
(b) As used in this act, "children's attorney" refers to the public official
designated under this section to present family court cases by the appropriate
local executive official with the consent of the local legislative body. The children's
attorney shall be an attorney at law duly admitted to practice in the state of
New York. The local law official may be designated the children's attorney but in
no event shall the children's attorney be an official or employee of any other
agency or subdivision of local government.
(c) As a public law enforcement official, the children's attorney shall seek
the protection of children and the community through justice and due process.
His conduct should be guided by the best interests of children before the court.
(d) In all child protective proceedings, the children's attorney shall present
the case in support of the petition and assist in all stages of the proceedings, in-
cluding appeals in connection therewith.
(e) In all other proceedings under this act, the family court or the appro-
priate appellate division may request the children's attorney to present the case in
support of the petition when, in the opinion of the family court or appellate
division, such presentation will serve the purposes of the act. When so requested,
the children's attorney shall present the case in support of the petition, and assist
in all stages of the proceedings, including appeals in connection therewith.
(f) To the fullest extent possible, the services performed by the children's
attorney shall be purchased by local departments of social services in the further-
ence of their responsibilities. When so purchased, such services shall be considered
reimbursable by the state and shall be reimbursed by the state in the same manner
and to the same extent as if the children's attorney were an employee of such local
department.
59 See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
60 See (1972) Assy. Int. No. 12234 (1972) (Committee on Rules) (proposed N.Y. FAMILY
Cr. Acr § 254 (a)); CHILD ABUSE REPORT 155.
61 CmLD ABusE REPORT 155.
62 (1972) Assy. Int. No. 12234 (1972) (Committee on Rules) (proposed N.Y. FAMILY
Cr. Acr § 254 (c)).
63 See notes 48-56 and accompanying text supra. No changes were proposed for the
sections of the Family Court Act that establish the Law Guardians or specify their duties
and role. It was apparently the belief of the Committee that the Law Guardians should
[Vol. 58:177
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The Children's Attorney bill was rapidly approved in both houses
of the legislature, 4 but it was vetoed by Governor Nelson Rockefeller.65
The Governor explained that although he recognized the seriousness
of the problem of child abuse and the weaknesses of the present law, he
found the legislation infirm in structure, unwise financially, and in
need of further study.66
CONCLUSION
The work of the Committee on Child Abuse and its Report repre-
sent a significant step in the study of abuse and the role of counsel for
the child. Their conclusions demonstrate many of the strengths and
weaknesses of an operational "right to counsel" system. The criticisms
of the Law Guardians as counsel for abused children reveal flaws which
must be remedied to ensure truly effective representation. The sug-
gestion that a public attorney specialize in the prosecution of children's
cases is an interesting innovation which could serve to alleviate the
problems inherent in this type of litigation.67
The great need for counsel to represent abused children effec-
tively was dearly recognized by the New York Assembly Select Com-
mittee on Child Abuse and should be recognized as a safeguard which
society is obliged to protect. A child's future can be conclusively deter-
mined in an abuse proceeding, and without the "guiding hand of coun-
remain the nominal representatives of the children but that actual, effective representation
be transferred to the Children's Attorney. See CaIL ABusE REPORT 152-56.
64 The bill was passed by the Assembly on April 26, 1972 and by the Senate on May
9, 1972.
65 N.Y. Exec. Release No. 282 (June 8, 1972).
66 Id. The Governor made several significant statements in his veto message. He
recognized that "[t]he victims of child abuse are the young and innocent; its after effects
linger for years-harming the child, his family and the society with which he must cope."
Id. He expressed "complete agreement with the objectives of the [bill], to insure that the
resources of the State, local governments and voluntary agencies will be most effectively
employed in a unified fight against this emotionally crippling phenomenon." However, he
concluded that "many of the key operative procedural provisions ... [are] too vague to
permit appropriate implementation without further revision. Moreover, the [bill] would
impose an additional financial burden ... without assurance that adequate funds would
be available." Id. The Governor expressed hope that further study and modification
would result in a measure in which he could concur.
67 One aspect of the proposed measure perhaps deserves further consideration. The
goals of adequately representing the child and of investigating and preparing the case are
not necessarily at odds with one another. Future reforms might combine the roles of the
Law Guardian and the short-lived Children's Attorney in a single child representation
specialist. The problems present in serving dual interests, such as those of attorney and
guardian ad litem (see note 48 supra), must first be solved.
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sel" the results can be tragic. As the French philosopher Jean-Jacques
Rousseau recognized over two centuries ago, the time is at hand for us
to "speak less of the duties of children and more of their rights."6 8
Eugene N. Kaplan
68 Quoted in THE BATmrEEm CHmD ix.
